Frege Function And Concept Pdf
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Skip to search form Skip to main content You are currently offline. Some features of the site may not work correctly. Geach and M.
Concepts and Objects
On Scientific Representations pp Cite as. With good will and patience we could consider all the answers thrown up by a look at the history of philosophy, one by one, in order to find the best one, that one that satisfies our own personal philosophical feeling. Although this does not really seem such a good idea: we would probably be dead long before we arrived at the end of the list of possible theories. To avoid this inane and insane effort, I will focus on only four of them, and then I will propose my own. By means of his extremely lucid analysis it will be clear that there is a wide conceptual gap between the classical theory, which considers concepts as classes class-concepts , and the modern and contemporary theories, which consider concepts as functions function-concepts. Unable to display preview.
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Concepts and Objects
This paper casts doubt on a recent criticism of Frege's theory of concepts and extensions by showing that it misses one of Frege's most important contributions: the derivation of the infinity of the natural numbers. We show how this result may be incorporated into the conceptual structure of Zermelo- Fraenkel Set Theory. The paper clarifies the bearing of the development of the notion of a real-valued function on Frege's theory of concepts; it concludes with a brief discussion of the claim that the standard interpretation of second-order logic is necessary for the derivation of the Peano Postulates and the proof of their categoricity. Most users should sign in with their email address. If you originally registered with a username please use that to sign in. To purchase short term access, please sign in to your Oxford Academic account above. Don't already have an Oxford Academic account?
Besides providing Frege's fullest account of his notion of a function, it also marks the first appear- ance of his distinction between Sinn and Bedeutung.] Preface.
EN English Deutsch. Your documents are now available to view. Confirm Cancel. Gottlob Frege. In: California Library Reprint Series.
The first section below considers why a philosophical investigation of language mattered at all for Frege, the mathematician, and why it should have mattered to him. At the same time, the considerations may serve to illustrate some general motivations that were behind the development of philosophy of language as a separate branch of philosophy in the 20th century. Long before Frege, it was considered commonplace that language is a necessary vehicle for human thought.
It was first published as an article in In general, a concept is a function whose value is always a truth value A relation is a two place function whose value is always a truth value Frege draws an important distinction between concepts on the basis of their level. Frege tells us that a first-level concept is a one-place function that correlates objects with truth-values
- Он улыбнулся и сразу перешел к делу. - Мы вместе спустимся. - Он поднял беретту. - Ты найдешь терминал Хейла, а я тебя прикрою. Сьюзан была отвратительна даже мысль об .