Naming And Necessity Kripke Pdf
File Name: naming and necessity kripke .zip
The lecture notes are closely tied to the readings and are designed to help the student comprehend and consider the issues presented. Don't show me this again.
Semantics of Natural Language pp Cite as. I hope that some people see some connection between the two topics in the title. If not, anyway, such connections will be developed in the course of these talks.
Naming and Necessity
Semantics of Natural Language pp Cite as. I hope that some people see some connection between the two topics in the title. If not, anyway, such connections will be developed in the course of these talks. Materialism, in this form, often now gets involved in very intricate ways in questions about what is necessary or contingent in identity of properties — questions like that. So, it is really very important to philosophers who may want to work in many domains to get clear about these concepts.
Advertisement Hide. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves. This is a preview of subscription content, log in to check access. As the style of the transcript makes clear, I gave the talks without a written text, and, in fact, without notes. The present text is lightly edited from the verbatim transcript; an occasional passage has been added to expand the thought, an occasional sentence has been rewritten, but no attempt has been made to change the informal style of the original.
Many of the footnotes have been added to the original, but a few were originally spoken asides in the talks themselves. I hope the reader will bear these facts in mind as he reads the text. Imagining it spoken, with proper pauses and emphases, may occasionally facilitate comprehension. I have agreed to publish the talks in this form with some reservations. The time allotted, and the informal style, necessitated a certain amount of compression of the argument, inability to treat certain objections, and the like.
Especially in the concluding sections on scientific identities and the mind-body problem thoroughness had to be sacrificed. Some topics essential to a full presentation of the viewpoint argued here, especially that of existence statements and empty names, had to be omitted altogether. Further, the informality of the presentation may well have engendered a sacrifice of clarity at certain points. All these defects were accepted in the interest of early publication. I hope that perhaps I will have the chance to do a more thorough job later.
To repeat, I hope the reader will bear in mind that he is largely reading informal lectures, not only when he encounters repetitions or infelicities, but also when he encounters irreverence or corn. Google Scholar. Given a chance to add a footnote, I shall mention that Rogers Albritton, Charles Chastain, Keith Donnellan, and Michael Slote in addition to philosophers mentioned in the text, especially Hilary Putnam , have independently expressed views with points of contact with various aspects of what I say here.
Albritton called the problems of necessity and a prioricity in natural kinds to my attention, by raising the question whether we could discover that lemons were not fruits.
I am not sure he would accept all my conclusions. The apology in the text still stands; I am aware that the list in this footnote is far from comprehensive. I make no attempt to enumerate those friends and students whose stimulating conversations have helped me. Thomas Nagel and Gilbert Harman deserve special thanks for their help in editing the transcript. CrossRef Google Scholar. Two men glimpse someone at a distance and think they recognize him as Jones. I am tentatively inclined to believe, in opposition to Donnellan, that his remarks about reference have little to do with semantics or truth-conditions, though they may be relevant to a theory of speech-acts.
Then the speaker may refer to something other than the semantic referent if he has appropriate false beliefs. They have sense in a strong way, namely, we should be able to give a definite description such that the referent of the name, by definition, is the object satisfying the description. When I speak of the Frege-Russell view and its variants, I include only those versions which give a substantive theory of the reference of names. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations , translated by G.
Anscombe, MacMillan, , p. John R. Those determinists who deny the importance of the individual in history may well argue that had Moses never existed, someone else would have arisen to achieve all that he did.
Here I am just dealing with an intuitive notion and will keep on the level of an intuitive notion. That is, we think that some things, though they are in fact the case, might have been otherwise. I might not have given these lectures today. Quite a different question is the epistemological question, how any particular person knows that I gave these lectures today.
I suppose in that case he does know this is a posteriori. But, if someone were born with an innate belief that I was going to give these lectures today, who knows? At any rate, the two questions being asked are different. The example I gave asserts a certain property — electoral victory — to be accidental to Nixon, independently of how he is described. Of course, if the notion of accidental property is meaningful, the notion of essential property must be meaningful also.
This is not to say that there are any essential properties — though, in fact, I think there are. The usual argument questions the meaningfulness of essentialism, and says that whether a property is accidental or essential to an object depends on how it is described.
It is thus not the view that all properties are accidental. Of course, it is also not the view, held by some idealists, that all properties are essential, all relations internal. David K. There are other, lesser, formal difficulties as well. I cannot elaborate here. Rather, he thinks that similarities across possible worlds determine a counterpart relation which need be neither symmetric nor transitive. The counterpart of something in another possible world is never identical with the thing itself.
The important issues, however, are common to the two views: the supposition that other possible worlds are like other dimensions of a more inclusive universe, that they can be given only by purely qualitative descriptions, and that therefore either the identity relation or the counterpart relation must be established in terms of qualitative resemblance.
Many have pointed out to me that the father of counterpart theory is probably Leibniz. I will not go into such a historical question here. The apparatus of possible worlds has I hope been very useful as far as the set-theoretic model-theory of quantified modal logic is concerned, but has encouraged philosophical pseudo-problems and misleading pictures. Demonstratives can be used as rigid designators, and free variables can be used as rigid designators of unspecified objects.
Of course when we specify a counterfactual situation, we do not describe the whole possible world, but only the portion which interests us. See Lecture I, p. There is some vagueness here. If a chip, or molecule, of a given table had been replaced by another one, we would be content to say that we have the same table. But if too many chips were different, we would seem to have a different one. The same problem can, of course, arise for identity over time. Where the identity relation is vague, it may seem intransitive; a claim of apparent identity may yield an apparent non-identity.
The counterpart relation can then be declared to be vague and intransitive. It seems, however, Utopian to suppose that we will ever reach a level of ultimate, basic particulars for which identity relations are never vague and the danger of intransitivity is eliminated. The danger usually does not arise in practice, so we ordinarily can speak simply of identity without worry.
Logicians have not developed a logic of vagueness. I think the problem would still arise. See footnote In the formal semantics of modal logic, the sense of a term t is usually taken to be the possibly partial function which assigns to each possible world H the referent of t in H.
For a rigid designator, such a function is constant. Some philosophers have thought that descriptions, in English, are ambiguous, that sometimes they non-rigidly designate, in each world, the object if any satisfying the description, while sometimes they rigidly designate the object actually satisfying the description.
Others, inspired by Donnellan, say the description sometimes rigidly designates the object thought or presupposed to satisfy the description. I find any such alleged ambiguities dubious.
In the formal semantics of intensional logic, suppose we take a definite description to designate, in each world, the object satisfying the description. It is indeed useful to have an operator which transforms each description into a term which rigidly designates the object actually satisfying the description.
Strawson, Individuals , Methuen, London, , Ch. Searle, op. Occasionally, I have heard such loose usages adduced as counterexamples to the applicability of the present theory to ordinary language. Further, although under certain circumstances Aristotle would not have taught Alexander, these are not circumstances under which he would not have been Aristotle.
But, merely by fixing a system of measurement, has he thereby learned some contingent information about the world, some new fact that he did not know before? It seems plausible that in some sense he did not, even though it is undeniably a contingent fact that S is one meter long. So there may be a case for reformulating the thesis that everything a priori is necessary so as to save it from this type of counterexample.
Since I will not attempt such a reformulation, I shall consistently use the term a priori in the text so as to make statements whose truth follows from a definition which fixes a reference a priori.
Strawson, op. Strawson actually considers the case of several speakers, pools their properties, and takes a democratic equally weighted vote. He requires only a sufficient plurality, not a majority.
See, for example, H. The fact that we call him Jonah cannot be used to single him out without circularity.
Naming and Necessity
Naming and Necessity is a book with the transcript of three lectures, given by the philosopher Saul Kripke , at Princeton University in , in which he dealt with the debates of proper names in the philosophy of language. Language is a primary concern of analytic philosophers , particularly the use of language to express concepts and to refer to individuals. In Naming and Necessity , Kripke considers several questions that are important within analytic philosophy:. Kripke's three lectures constitute an attack on descriptivist theories of proper names. According to descriptivist theories, proper names either are synonymous with descriptions, or have their reference determined by virtue of the name's being associated with a description or cluster of descriptions that an object uniquely satisfies.
In , the University of Haifa awarded Saul Kripke an honorary degree and hosted a conference in his honour. The papers collected in this volume descend from that conference. A preface by the editor, Jonathan Berg, includes a succinct summary of each paper. So, I will forego unnecessary summarization and, instead, discuss two papers in detail. Most users should sign in with their email address.
I hope that some people see some connection between the two topics in the title. If not, anyway, such connections will be developed in the course of these talks. Materialism, in this form, often now gets involved in very intricate ways in questions about what is necessary or contingent in identity of properties- questions like that. So, it is really very important to philosophers who may want to work in many domains to get clear about these concepts. The first topic in the pair of topics is naming. By a name here I will mean a proper name, i.
Naming, Necessity and More
Skip to search form Skip to main content You are currently offline. Some features of the site may not work correctly. DOI: Kripke Published Philosophy.
Kutipan per tahun. Kutipan duplikat. Artikel berikut digabungkan di Scholar. Paduan kutipannya hanya dihitung untuk artikel pertamanya saja. Kutipan yang digabung.
The system can't perform the operation now. Try again later. Citations per year. Duplicate citations.
Please note that ebooks are subject to tax and the final price may vary depending on your country of residence. Saul Kripke is one of the most important and original post-war analytic philosophers.
Какие вообще у них есть доказательства, что Танкадо действительно создал Цифровую крепость. Только его собственные утверждения в электронных посланиях. И конечно… ТРАНСТЕКСТ. Компьютер висел уже почти двадцать часов.
Внезапная пустота, разверзшаяся вокруг него, была невыносима. Сьюзан равнодушно смотрела на ТРАНСТЕКСТ. Она понимала, что огненный шар, заточенный в керамическую клетку, скоро вырвется наружу и поглотит. Она почти физически ощущала, как этот шар поднимается вверх все быстрее, пожирая кислород, высвобождаемый горящими чипами.
Автобус тронулся, а Беккер бежал за ним в черном облаке окиси углерода. - Espera! - крикнул он ему вдогонку.